The Iran War and PFAS

From Military Poisons

Part 1 of a 2-part series

Pat Elder
March 21, 2026

Israeli warplanes set Iran’s South Pars gas field ablaze on March 18, 2026.

On March 18, 2026, Israeli warplanes struck Iran’s South Pars gas field, igniting fires across one of the most critical energy complexes on Earth. The attack targeted infrastructure at the heart of the global natural gas system, sending flames through facilities that underpin a significant share of the world’s fertilizer production.

The South Pars strike is not just an energy story—it is also a story about the global food supply. Modern agriculture is fundamentally dependent on natural gas, which is used to produce ammonia and urea fertilizers. The Persian Gulf region supplies a substantial share of the world’s nitrogen fertilizers, so disruptions to this system reverberate immediately through global markets, agricultural production, and ultimately the food supply.

Countries most exposed to fertilizer shocks—particularly Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and import-dependent nations across Southeast and South Asia—are increasingly turning to wastewater sludge as a substitute nutrient source, a shift that risks transferring industrial PFAS contamination from urban waste streams directly onto agricultural soils. We will examine that shift in Part 2.

Here, we’ll examine the contamination unfolding from the widespread use of aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) across the war theater.

Fires at gas fields, refineries, tank farms, and export terminals are not fought with water. Hydrocarbon fires require foam. At petroleum and gas installations, fire suppression systems have long been built around aqueous film-forming foam, or AFFF, a firefighting agent designed to spread across fuel surfaces, suppress flammable vapors, and prevent re-ignition. Foam smothers the fires. Its active ingredients are made of carcinogenic PFAS compounds.

For decades, AFFF has been the global standard for fighting liquid fuel fires in the military, at airports, and throughout the oil and gas sector. Most refineries and LNG plants in the Gulf were built long before the recent push toward fluorine-free alternatives. Their systems were designed around fluorinated foams.

Even where fluorine-free foams are beginning to enter the market, the transition is spotty, especially in high-risk petroleum settings where operators remain reluctant to abandon legacy systems. Often, an “environment be damned” mentality prevails while putting out petroleum fires.

In Iran, it is likely that older, deadlier AFFF stockpiles remain in use. Sanctions have tortured the Iranians on many fronts, constraining access to newer technologies and replacement equipment.

AFFF is a delivery system for PFAS, linked to cancer, immune dysfunction, endocrine disruption, and developmental harm. The compounds travel with firefighting runoff, infiltrate soil, enter drainage systems, contaminate surface water, and move into wastewater streams. In a war involving repeated fires at petroleum and gas facilities, PFAS contamination will become a defining legacy of the conflict.

The image shows a foam system used for dike protection in oil and gas facilities. While the specific foam type shown here cannot be determined visually, such systems in the Gulf region have historically been designed around PFAS-based foams. 
https://gulffire%5Bdot%5Dcom/meeting-the-challenges-of-transitioning-to-fluorine-free-foam-agents/

Calculating the scale

Exact volumes of foam used in the current war are not publicly reported, but industry standards make clear the likely scale. Large hydrocarbon fires at refineries and tank farms can require sustained foam application over wide surface areas for hours or even days. A single major dike or tank fire can consume thousands of gallons of foam concentrate.  

Across multiple simultaneous fires involving storage tanks, pipelines, refineries, and gas-processing infrastructure, cumulative use can rise into the hundreds of thousands of gallons of concentrate, producing millions of gallons of finished foam solution.

A large fuel storage tank fire can require thousands of gallons of 3% AFFF concentrate and hundreds of thousands of gallons of finished foam solution to extinguish. The concentrate is typically mixed at a ratio of 3% foam concentrate to 97% water and then aerated to produce the firefighting foam.

AFFF-type foams require approximately 1 gallon per minute  liquid concentrate flow for every 10 square feet of burning surface on a hydrocarbon-type fuel.

A large storage tank in the South Pars Gas Complex may contain a 78-meter diameter. This is 4,778 square meters, which converts to about 51,434 square feet.

This tank would require 5,143 gallons of liquid foam concentrate per minute.  It may require from 10 to 30 minutes to extinguish the flame in a single tank.

AFFF Requirements for a single 78-Meter Diameter Tank Fire  (3% Solution)

Time applied       Gals. Conc.           Gals. Foam

10 minutes             1,543                    51,430                 
20 minutes             3,086                   102,860               
30 minutes             4,629                   154,290  

===========             

Israeli strikes on Iran’s South Pars gas field and the Asaluyeh processing hub on March 18 triggered a wave of retaliatory attacks across the Gulf that hit refineries, gas plants and export terminals in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Reuters, March 20, 2026

Following is a list of locations where missiles and drones have ignited blazes that have likely been doused with AFFF:

  • South Pars gas field, Iran
  • Asaluyeh, Iran
  • Shahran fuel tanks, Tehran, Iran
  • Ras Laffan Industrial City / LNG facilities, Qatar
  • Pearl gas-to-liquids plant, Ras Laffan, Qatar.
  • Mina al-Ahmadi refinery, Kuwait
  • Mina Abdullah refinery, Kuwait
  • Ras Tanura refinery / export complex, Saudi Arabia
  • SAMREF Refinery, Yanbu, Saudi Arabia
  • Ruwais refinery complex, UAE
  • Fujairah oil industry zone / export terminal , UAE
  • Bapco Sitra refinery / oil refinery complex, Bahrain
  • Haifa  Oil Refinery, Israel
  • Lanaz refinery, Erbil
  • Two fuel tankers in Iraqi waters near Basra
  • Oil tanker off Oman’s Musandam peninsula
  • Habshan gas processing complex, UAE
  • Bab oil field, UAE
  • Ashdod refinery, Israel

In multi-site, simultaneous attacks like those unfolding on our TV screens, total AFFF use can top  millions  of gallons, injecting venomous poisons into the earth throughout the Middle East.

From Fire Suppression to Environmental Contamination

When thousands of gallons of concentrate are deployed in a single incident, the result is the runoff of significant quantities of persistent fluorinated chemicals into the environment. At coastal facilities, which describe many of the sites now burning across the Persian Gulf, this runoff often moves quickly into marine environments. The Gulf is a semi-enclosed body of water with limited circulation, making it particularly vulnerable to the accumulation of persistent contaminants.‍ ‍

In the Gulf states, where a substantial portion of food is imported, the most immediate pathway of exposure is not through local agriculture but through the marine environment itself. Fisheries in the Persian Gulf, along with those in the waters of the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean, are susceptible to contamination as PFAS move through food webs.‍ ‍

Unlike hydrocarbons, which burn off or degrade over time, PFAS do not break down under environmental conditions. They bind to sediments and accumulate in living organisms rather than remaining dissolved in open water. Instead of dispersing harmlessly, they are taken up by soils, sediments, and biological tissues, where they persist and concentrate over time.‍ ‍

The result is a shift in how the environmental impact of war should be understood. Oil fires have long been associated with air pollution and visible ecological damage. The widespread use of AFFF introduces a hidden, more persistent hazard, one that does not dissipate when the flames are extinguished. ‍ ‍

The contamination is also largely unmeasured. There are no coordinated monitoring programs tracking PFAS releases during wartime fire suppression, no public accounting of the volumes used, and no framework for post-conflict remediation. What is being dispersed across the region is effectively invisible in real time, even as it establishes a chemical legacy that may persist for centuries or longer.‍ ‍

There is no robust, systematic body of studies on PFAS in marine fish from the Arabian Sea or Persian Gulf.  A host of global studies show that PFAS readily accumulate in seafood and can be transported across regions through both ocean currents and migratory species.‍‍‍‍ ‍

Lesson from Brunswick, Maine

‍On August 19, 2024, a malfunctioning fire suppression system at the former Brunswick Naval Air Station released approximately 1,450 gallons of AFFF concentrate mixed with 50,000 gallons of water, marking one of the largest accidental PFAS foam spills in history.

‍1,450 gallons pales in comparison to the millions being unloosed in the war, although it poisoned the region forever. The state analyzed the composition of the foam concentrate and published the shocking results, shown below. PFOS levels that drained into the grass topped 3.78 billion parts per trillion. PFOS is highly mobile in soil and groundwater.

The US EPA had committed to keeping groundwater that is used for drinking water under 4 parts per trillion of PFOS and PFOA, although actual enforcement has been pushed back to 2031 by the Trump Administration.

‍Results below are shown in ng/L or parts per trillion. ‍‍‍ ‍

Alpha Analytical  – 08/23/24. PFOA at levels less the 1 part per trillion in drinking water is linked to pancreatic cancer.  At Brunswick PFOA was recorded at 69,000,000 parts per trillion in liquids that seeped into the ground.
https://www.maine%5Bdot%5Dgov/dep/bep/Brunswick%20Airbase.pdf

In the conflagration that is the Persian Gulf, the disparate PFAS compounds in AFFF do not combine into a single new chemical. Instead, they are released as a complex mixture: some persist in their original form, some gradually transform into terminal compounds such as PFOS and PFOA, and all of them partition differently among seawater, sediments, wastewater, and living organisms. The result is not one contaminant, but a shifting, perpetual fluorinated burden that can intensify over time as precursor compounds degrade into more stable end products.

While black smoke fills the sky and headlines focus on oil prices, a chemical catastrophe is unfolding across the Middle East. The same war that is destabilizing global energy and food markets is coating landscapes, drainage systems, industrial wastewater streams, and coastal waters with deadly and  persistent fluorinated  compounds. The public hears about flames and airstrikes. It is not hearing about the highly carcinogenic foams sprayed to extinguish them.

://www.militarypoisons.org/latest-news/the-iran-war-and-pfas

Ukrainian government forces are mining civilian infrastructure in Debaltsevo

Posted on Fort Russ

<iframe width=”480″ height=”270″ src=”https://www.youtube.com/embed/V9Re1P_7EAI&#8221; frameborder=”0″ allowfullscreen>

February 8, 2015
News Front
Eduard Basurin, Deputy Commander of DPR Ministry of Defense

Translated by Kristina Rus
During the last day DPR forces continued defensive operations along the entire line of contact.
The most intense fighting was on the outskirts of Debaltsevo, where the enemy is making dire attempts to expand the encirclement, and return the localities, abandoned earlier.
Over the last 24 hours as a result of fighting along the entire frontline, DPR lost:
1 BMP, 1 SAU, 3 mortars, 11 killed, 29 wounded.
According to the information, received today while questioning two Ukrainian POW’s from the 25th brigade, captured on the outskirts of Chernukhino, Ukrainian command had ordered to mine railroad infrastructure in Debaltsevo. The goal is not to allow an opportunity of restoring railroad connection between Donetsk and Lugansk Republics after Ukrainian troops retreat from the encirclement towards Artemovsk. Locomotives, freight trains, junctions at the Debaltsevo-Sortirovochnaya station, Locomotive depoes, traffic control centers are mined, as well as the administrative zone of the Debaltsevo terminal. 
Besides, according to the POW’s, on Friday city pumping stations and electrical substations have already been mined in Debaltsevo.
Therefore, Kiev has already prepared for the destruction of the city after pulling out its troops. 
During the fighting today DPR had completely captured Kalinovka and Redkodub, abandoned by Ukrainian forces.
Military operations to repulse counterattacks continued in Chernukhino,
On the morning of February 8, DPR had captured a strategically important height 2 kilometers North-West of village Lozovoy, which had increased the opportunity of DPR to intercept supplies and reserves of Debaltsevo army group.
Two counterattacks by UAF attempted in order to return control of this height have been repulsed with heavy losses in mapower and equipment.
On Donetsk front, Ukrainian security forces continued attacks from Smerch and Grad, as well as large caliber artillery:
4 strikes on Donetsk residential neighborhoods
21 strikes on Donetsk suburbs
7 strikes on Donetsk airport
As well as strikes on Peski, Veseloye and Spartak
Mariupol front:
UAF fired heavily on militia positions from MRLS
21 Ukrainian armed vehicles arrived at the Eastern outskirts of Mariupol
Concentration of additional troops at this location is a sign of an upcoming attack on the defensive lines in  Novo-Azovsk.
Losses of Ukrainian security forces for the last day:
11 tanks (8 destroyed, 3 captured), 9 artillery installations, 6 BMP and BTR, (3 destroyed, 2 captured), 11 vehicles, 45 people killed
Total since the start of military operations over the last  22 days the enemy has lost:
3 airplanes, 1 helicopter, 168 tanks, 133 BMP, BTR, MTLB, 124 field artillery guns, 94 vehicles, 2,056 people killed
After strikes on populated areas of the Republic there are casualties among civillians.
Over the last day:
2 people killed, 9 wounded
Killed: one in Donetsk, one in Makeevka
Wounded: 8 people in Donetsk, one in Makeevka
Donetsk:
Petrovsky district – 2 people
Leninsky – 2
Kuibyshevsky – one
Kievsky -1 person.
The strike on Kievsky was on a store in the 7th quarter, but the suspicion is that a bus stop was targeted.
There were 9 fires recorded as a result of artillery strikes. Twice emergency services were fired on, when rushing to put out a fire, one in Donetsk, one in Makeevka.
Kristina Rus: There is a talk of a mysterious info blackout on frontline updates from militia. This update is from DPR Defense Ministry official, but there is suspicion that NAF is up to something and doesn’t want too many details to get out there for now…

 http://fortruss.blogspot.com/2015/02/ukrainian-forces-are-mining-civillian.html