A revolt that didn’t happen — Kolomoisky

From Colonel Cassad, March 25, 2015

Several theses about the consequences of Kolomoisky’s defeat.

1. The resignation of Kolomoisky from the position of the governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region implies that there will be a reconfiguration of the political and economical field of the South-Eastern Ukraine. The chief jew-banderovite will be replaced by Rezhnichenko, who is a person from Poroshenko’s deck. Previously, he was given the Zaporozhye region to be his feeding ground. Some mistakenly believed that the reason of the conflict lies in the energy assets. However, the real reason is primarily the establishment of political control over the regions of the south-east, which where Kolomoisky previously reigned unchallenged. The permission from Washington was obtained for this process, which predetermined the rapid capitulation of Kolomoisky. This whole story shows how, by a single motion from Washington, can the intra-Ukrainian political alignment change and how far a regular Ukrainian is far from determining his fate and how little power even the bloodsuckers from the junta leadership actually wield over it.

2. Some mistakenly believe that Kolomoisky has some kind of clever plan, that he’ll go now and then he’ll emerge and… and then he’ll do something.
In the reality he will do nothing, after his resignation and Korban’s resignation (he also left today), Kolomoisky lost the abilities that he obtained by integrating into the government bureaucracy. If before the governors whom he appointed in the South-East went to bow before Kolomoisky in Dnepropetrovsk, now they’ll go to bow before Poroshenko in Kiev. The appointee of the head of Poroshenko’s administration now sits in the domain of the former master of the South-East. Palitsa in Odessa rushed to remove the visiting bandits from the city even before the resignation of Kolomoisky, which of course didn’t save the city from yet another showdown. On this background, quite concrete threats directed at Kolomoisky were sounded, which were much more substantial than his weak attempts of collecting signatures for the resignation of Nalivaychenko or of threatening with a maidan. Actually, the essence of these threats is simple: Kolomoisky, having relinquished his political power, must also relinquish his repression power by releasing the punitive troops who obey him and locking them onto the centralized structures of the SBU and the MIA. The bandit nature of these units won’t change, but they must now report not to Kolomoisky but to Avakov, Nalivaychenko, and Poroshenko. Correspondingly, if this scheme will be implemented (and I believe that it will be implemented), then Kolomoisky will become just a rich and influential person, but also somebody who has no ability of opposing Poroshenko in matters of policy of force.

3. Whether Kolomoisky will be able to keep “his precious” in the state assets will depend on the terms of his capitulation. A scenario in which Kolomoisky may be allowed to keep the control over “Ukrnafta” in exchange for obedience the transfer of punitive troops to the different owners without too much hassle. However, considering the peculiarities of the Ukrainian politics, they’ll probably try to utterly fleece Kolomoisky, taking revenge for all of his previous misdeeds. Thankfully, Kolomoisky made plenty of enemies in Ukraine. The “Privat” group itself is unlikely to be dismembered, because this may trigger the collapse of the already weakened “Privat-Bank”. However, its influence will likely be maximally restricted, with the intent of turning Kolomoisky into yet another “unpretentious oligarch”. Naturally, Kolomoisky will resist where he can in order to not permit the full collapse of his empire, but these will be precisely the rearguard skirmishes, when the main battle is already lost.

4. This story will obviously strengthen Poroshenko’s power, but to a limited degree, because Avakov, Yatsenyuk, and Nalivaychenko are at this moment only situational allies of Poroshenko in his fight with Kolomoisky. Also, the emergence if these allies was secured not by the influence of Poroshenko himself, but rather by the “goodwill” of Washington, which made a clear bet on Poroshenko and which suggested to Kolomoisky that he shouldn’t cross the true owners of the Ukraine. Hence the absence of revolts, maidans, and marches on Kiev, because this would imply taking a stand directly against Washington. This would be funny, considering the fact that Kolomoisky’s assets are located in the West. Kolomoisky is certainly a thug, but he is not a moron. So it was easier to lose power than it was to lose everything. Therefore, despite all of their noisy threats against Kiev, Kolomoisky and Korban casually surrendered their power today.

5. Strengthening of the central authority in Kiev will mean that the controllability of the processes in the South-East will increase because instead of the headstrong Kolomoisky and his appointees there will be mostly obedient Gauleiters sitting there, who will implement the general line of the Kiev junta. It is also guaranteed that the portion of grey business associated with the trade through the front line will now belong to the new masters of regions (this primarily has to do with semi-legal and illegal schemes of coal trading). The punitive battalions will be forced to report to the centralized structures — either the MIA or the SBU (the “Right Sector” militants will likely remain under Nalivaychenko, naturally nobody is going to let Yarosh in the General Staff now) with a more realistic operational control by sector commands. Also it is worth expecting the decrease of pressure on the General Staff and Muzhenko, because the informational attack on them was sponsored by Kolomoisky. Besides this, after the fall of Kolomoisky the traditional outflow of his former associates to the winning camp will start. Naturally, Kolomoisky, unless he will be fully destroyed, will keep a part of his political clutter in the form of the purchased MPs in the Verkhovnaya Rada. However, this will be more of a regular lobbyist group than an instrument for the struggle for power now. For Novorossia the fall of Kolomoisky and the centralization of the command over punitive battalions will imply that it will no longer be possible to underwrite the ongoing war on the designs of Kolomoisky and “uncontrolled battalions”. “Partner Pete” is now responsible for everything. On the other side, the centralization of control in Ukraine will more likely serve the goals of internal mobilization of the junta in the face of the next stage of the war. Little has actually changed for Novorossia, just like before her future will depend on the outcome of the military standoff against the AFU.

Should we sympathize with Kolomoisky? Of course, not. Along with Turchinov and Poroshenko, Kolomoisky is one of the most bloody junta bosses, who did much for the civil war to follow its bloodiest scenario. The exasperation of the war is in many ways due to precisely the activity of Kolomoisky, which led to the Odessa Khatyn, after which all of the remaining bridges were burned. In principle, I don’t abandon the hope that sooner or later justice will reach Kolomoisky, as well as other chiefs of a coup that ended with a civil war.

Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2107559.html (in Russian)


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