The bill’s list of means for supporting democracy in Ukraine includes the supply of lethal defensive weapons systems. The legislation will come into force following a vote in the Senate and its signing by the US President. From that point on, Washington will be able to officially supply lethal weapons to Ukraine.
114th CONGRESS
2d Session
Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
To contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine, to assist Ukraine’s democratic transition, and for other purposes.
(a) Short Title.—This Act may be cited as the “Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act” or “STAND for Ukraine Act”.
(b) Table Of Contents.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Statements of policy.
Sec. 101. United States policy against recognition of territorial changes effected by force alone.
Sec. 102. Prohibitions against United States recognition of the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea.
Sec. 103. Determinations and codification of sanctions under Executive Order No. 13685.
Sec. 201. Prohibiting certain transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights abusers with respect to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 202. Report on certain foreign financial institutions.
Sec. 203. Requirements relating to transfers of defense articles and defense services to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 301. Strategy to respond to Russian Federation-supported information and propaganda efforts directed toward Russian-speaking communities in countries bordering the Russian Federation.
Sec. 302. Cost limitation.
Sec. 303. Sunset.
(a) In General.—It is the policy of the United States to further assist the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity to contain, reverse, and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine. That policy shall be carried into effect, among other things, through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with allies and partners of the United States where appropriate, that includes sanctions, diplomacy, and assistance, including lethal defensive weapons systems, for the people of Ukraine intended to enhance their ability to consolidate a rule of law-based democracy with a free market economy and to exercise their right under international law to self-defense.
(b) Additional Statement Of Policy.—It is further the policy of the United States—
(1) to use its voice, vote, and influence in international fora to encourage others to provide assistance that is similar to assistance described in subsection (a) to Ukraine; and
(2) to ensure that any relevant sanctions relief for the Russian Federation is contingent on timely, complete, and verifiable implementation of the Minsk Agreements, especially the restoration of Ukraine’s control of the entirety of its eastern border with the Russian Federation in the conflict zone.
Between the years of 1940 and 1991, the United States did not recognize the forcible incorporation and annexation of the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union under a policy known as the “Stimson Doctrine”.
(a) In General.—In accordance with United States policy enumerated in section 101, no Federal department or agency should take any action or extend any assistance that recognizes or implies any recognition of the de jure or de facto sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea, its airspace, or its territorial waters.
(b) Documents Portraying Crimea As Part Of Russian Federation.—In accordance with United States policy enumerated in section 101, the Government Printing Office should not print any map, document, record, or other paper of the United States portraying or otherwise indicating Crimea as part of the territory of the Russian Federation.
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(a) Determinations.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the assessment described in paragraph (2).
(2) ASSESSMENT DESCRIBED.—The assessment described in this paragraph is—
(A) a review of each person designated pursuant to Executive Order No. 13660 (March 6, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) or Executive Order No. 13661 (March 16, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine); and
(B) a determination as to whether any such person meets the criteria for designation pursuant to Executive Order No. 13685 (December 19, 2014; 79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine).
(3) FORM.—The assessment required by paragraph (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
(b) Codification.—United States sanctions provided for in Executive Order No. 13685, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect until the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification described in subsection (c).
(c) Certification.—A certification described in this subsection is a certification of the President that Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea has been restored.
(d) Rule Of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict the authority of the President to impose additional United States sanctions with specific respect to the Russian Federation’s occupation of Crimea pursuant to Executive Order No. 13685.
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A section has frequent references to those who are “contributing to the situation in Ukraine.”
The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–95; 22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new sections:TITLE III—OTHER MATTERS
(a) In General.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to Russian Federation-supported disinformation and propaganda efforts directed toward persons in countries bordering the Russian Federation.
(b) Matters To Be Included.—The strategy required under subsection (a) should include the following:
(1) Development of a response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns as an element of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, specifically—
(A) assistance in building the capacity of the Ukrainian military to document conflict zones and disseminate information in real-time;
(B) assistance in enhancing broadcast capacity with terrestrial television transmitters in Eastern Ukraine; and
(C) media training for officials of the Government of Ukraine.
(2) Establishment of a partnership with partner governments and private-sector entities to provide Russian-language entertainment and news content to broadcasters in Russian-speaking communities bordering the Russian Federation.
(3) Assessment of the extent of Russian Federation influence in political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities seeking to exert political influence and sway public opinion in favor of Russian Federation policy across Europe.
(c) Report.—The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the strategy required under subsection (a) and its implementation.
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No additional funds are authorized to carry out the requirements of this Act and the amendments made by this Act. Such requirements shall be carried out using amounts otherwise authorized.
This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall cease to be effective beginning on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Passed the House of Representatives September 21, 2016.
H. R. 5094
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07/25/2016 |
The act’s adoption was an expected development. After all, it is well known that a Ukrainian lobby effectively works in the US and throughout the West. During his visit to New York, Poroshenko (right) met with representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora who have had strong positions in American political circles since the end of the Second World War.
As a point of comparison, the numerous Russian diaspora in the US and its organizations, and in particular the Congress of Russian Americans, are nowhere close to matching the efficiency of Ukrainian circles’ lobbying activism. The fault for this, in my opinion, can be assigned to both sides, both Russian Americans themselves and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and other government agencies and non-governmental organizations.
However, his assignation of fault is incorrect. They U.S. government has sponsored ultra-nationalist Ukrainian individuals and promoted this agenda since the close of World War II. This has been a concerted and well-funded campaign to destabilize Ukraine and make it a U.S. vassal state. This “efficiency” is U.S. government-backed. That’s hard to beat.
Given Russia’s continued efforts at diplomacy, it seems that Russian leaders can’t quite believe that America is such a determined Russian foe. However, it’s now becoming brutally clear what America’s intentions are and have always been.
…But the experience of American support for “democracy” around the world attests to the fact that the US Congress is in fact promising new bloodshed and destruction for the people of Ukraine and Donbass. Ukrainians have never been good strategists, and this obvious truth has never benefitted the majority. One only needs to look at the experience of former Yugoslavia or that of Libya and Syria to be assured that America’s “benevolence” towards the people of Ukraine will only lead to the further division of the country and new victims. The US is not interested in a strong Ukraine, but in deterring Russia at any cost. For them, Ukrainians are but expendable material, just like the people of Donbass.
…Although lethal weapons were illegally delivered earlier, as many Donbass militiamen and even Ukrainian soldiers have exposed, the official green light to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons in fact makes the US a party in the armed conflict in the former Ukraine.
… will put the blame on the United States for participating in the murder of the peaceful population of Donbass.
Free Ukraine Now 