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International Law: Minsk-2 Package of Measures, signed February 12, 2015; adopted by UN Security Council, February 17, 2015

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From United Nations Security Council

Resolution 2202 (2015)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 7384th meeting, on 17 February 2015
Annex 1

Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements

Minsk, 12 February 2015

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation as of 15 February 2015, 12 a.m. local time.

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides by equal distances in order to create a security zone of at least 50 km wide from each other for the artillery systems of calibre of 100 and more, a security zone of 70 km wide for MLRS and 140 km wide for MLRS “Tornado-S”, Uragan, Smerch and Tactical Missile Systems (Tochka, Tochka U):

– for the Ukrainian troops: from the de facto line of contact;

– for the armed formations from certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine: from the line of contact according to the Minsk Memorandum of Sept. 19th, 2014;

The withdrawal of the heavy weapons as specified above is to start on day 2 of the ceasefire at the latest and be completed within 14 days. The process shall be facilitated by the OSCE and supported by the Trilateral Contact Group.

3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from day 1 of the withdrawal, using all technical equipment necessary, including satellites, drones, radar equipment, etc.

4. Launch a dialogue, on day 1 of the withdrawal, on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” as well as on the future regime of these areas based on this law. Adopt promptly, by no later than 30 days after the date of signing of this document a Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine specifying the area enjoying a special regime, under the Law of Ukraine “On interim self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, based on the line of the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

6. Ensure release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons, based on the principle “all for all”. This process is to be finished on the day 5 after the withdrawal at the latest.

7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Definition of modalities of full resumption of socioeconomic ties, including social transfers such as pension payments and other payments (incomes and revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine). To this end, Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.

9. Reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) to be finalized by the end of 2015, provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new constitution entering into force by the end of 2015 providing for decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas), as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote until the end of 2015. [Note]

12. Based on the Law of Ukraine “On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions”, questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.

13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

Note

Such measures are, according to the Law on the special order for local selfgovernment in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions:

– Exemption from punishment, prosecution and discrimination for persons involved in the events that have taken place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– Right to linguistic self-determination;

– Participation of organs of local self-government in the appointment of heads of public prosecution offices and courts in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– Possibility for central governmental authorities to initiate agreements with organs of local self-government regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– State supports the social and economic development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– Support by central government authorities of cross-border cooperation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with districts of the Russian Federation;

– Creation of the people’s police units by decision of local councils for the maintenance of public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

– The powers of deputies of local councils and officials, elected at early elections, appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by this law, cannot be early terminated.

Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:

Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini

Second President of Ukraine, L. D. Kuchma

Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine, M. Yu. Zurabov

A.W. Zakharchenko

I.W. Plotnitski

Source:
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2202.pdf

No Ukrainian language in 1911 British encyclopaedia, but there Is the Little Russian dialect

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From Fort Russ

Translated by Ollie Richardson for Fort Russ
12th April, 2016
 
Taken from zhenziyou [Another Livejournal blogger – O.R.] in “Ukrainian dialect of the Russian language and the New Russia – Encyclopaedia Britannica 1911, New York, USA“
“The Russian dialects are divided into two main groups – large (Velikorusskij), including White (Belorusskij) Russian language and Little Russian (Malorusskij). The latter is spoken in a belt reaching from Galicia and the Northern Carpathians (see Ruthenians) through Podolia and Volhynia and the governments of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov and the southern part of Voronezh to the Don and the Kuban, upon which Dnepr Cossacks were settled. To the south of this belt in “New Russia” the population is very mixed, but Little Russians on the whole predominate. In all there must be about 30,000,000 Little Russians.”
PS. In the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica the following was written:
“The Little Russian dialect claims to be a literary language; it has established this claim in Galicia (see Ruthenians), but its use as such is much restricted in Russia. The Little Russians differ from the Great Russians not only in language but in physical type, customs, domestic architecture and folk-lore; but though Russophobes have tried to prove that this is due to the Finnish element in the Great Russians, it cannot be substantiated, and the Little Russians, especially the descendants of the Cossacks, have no small Tatar element in them. For the last three centuries they have been under strong Polish influence, and this has had great effect upon the vocabulary but not much on phonetics or morphology…”

Yushchenko: More than half of Ukrainians will not support joining NATO or a single official language

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Posted on Fort Russ, December 30, 2014
Dnrespublika.info
Translated from Russian by J. Hawk

The former President of Ukraine gave Poroshenko and his advisors a lecture on how to end the civil war and how to start a national dialogue.

The former President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko stated in an interview that more than half of Ukrainians would not support the country joining NATO or enshrining the Ukrainian language as the only official language.

“If you are in favor of a single official language in Ukraine, please keep in mind that more than half of the people would not support this idea.”

Yushchenko also believes that the Poroshenko regime’s desire to push the country into NATO is likewise a measure to which 60% of Ukrainians are opposed.

“If you want to transform Ukraine’s security policy toward membership in a European collective security structures, keep in mind that 60% of the country will not understand why.”

In addition, Viktor Yushchenko argued in favor of a general national dialogue:

“Whenever we talk of policies that may be given the label “Yanukovych policies”, one has to remember that, in addition to Yanukovych, these policies were backed by 12-14 million of Ukrainians. So if we want to reach a national consensus, a national rapprochement, we shouldn’t speak of Yanukovych but rather those 14 millions who think along the same lines as Yanukovych. We have to understand our strategic interests and our past, all the while preserving a national dialogue.”

The former president underscored the need for the national dialogue to compel Poroshenko and his supporters to take into consideration the interests of all citizens of Ukraine, so that Ukraine’s diversity would never again become the source of conflict:

“The diversity of our country cannot simply be a set of contradictions, but rather a distinguishing feature, and once we realize that these differences exist then the next step is to plan how to reconcile these differences.”

Translator’s Note:

Given the mounting pressure from the West to come to terms with Russia (as evidenced by newly announced IMF conditions for the next loan to Ukraine, which include Russia’s postponement of Ukraine’s repayment of its debt to Russia), it may be that Yushchenko, while an opponent of Yanukovych in the presidential elections, is nevertheless being seen both by Ukrainians and (especially) the West as someone more capable of effectively enforcing a more conciliatory Ukrainian policy toward Russia. This is something that Poroshenko (due to the absence of his own political team) is incapable of doing (which is reflected by the cold shoulder he has received from the EU) and the Yatsenyuk/Turchinov clique is unwilling to do, preferring instead to attempt extorting billions of euros by threatening Ukraine’s collapse—which would be very difficult to avoid in the absence of the resumption of favorable Russian economic policies toward Ukraine. Yushchenko represents a substantially pro-Western political tilt without the virulent anti-Russian rhetoric that the current Kiev government excels at, which arguably makes him the most qualified to move Ukraine out of its current crisis.

http://fortruss.blogspot.com/2014/12/yushchenko-more-than-half-of-ukrainians.html

Original: http://dnrespublika.info/yushhenko-bolshe-poloviny-ukraincev-ne-podderzhat-kurs-v-nato-edinyjj-gosyazyk/