No Ukrainian language in 1911 British encyclopaedia, but there Is the Little Russian dialect

From Fort Russ

Translated by Ollie Richardson for Fort Russ
12th April, 2016
Taken from zhenziyou [Another Livejournal blogger – O.R.] in “Ukrainian dialect of the Russian language and the New Russia – Encyclopaedia Britannica 1911, New York, USA
“The Russian dialects are divided into two main groups – large (Velikorusskij), including White (Belorusskij) Russian language and Little Russian (Malorusskij). The latter is spoken in a belt reaching from Galicia and the Northern Carpathians (see Ruthenians) through Podolia and Volhynia and the governments of Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava, Kharkov and the southern part of Voronezh to the Don and the Kuban, upon which Dnepr Cossacks were settled. To the south of this belt in “New Russia” the population is very mixed, but Little Russians on the whole predominate. In all there must be about 30,000,000 Little Russians.”
PS. In the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica the following was written:
“The Little Russian dialect claims to be a literary language; it has established this claim in Galicia (see Ruthenians), but its use as such is much restricted in Russia. The Little Russians differ from the Great Russians not only in language but in physical type, customs, domestic architecture and folk-lore; but though Russophobes have tried to prove that this is due to the Finnish element in the Great Russians, it cannot be substantiated, and the Little Russians, especially the descendants of the Cossacks, have no small Tatar element in them. For the last three centuries they have been under strong Polish influence, and this has had great effect upon the vocabulary but not much on phonetics or morphology…”

Yushchenko: More than half of Ukrainians will not support joining NATO or a single official language

Posted on Fort Russ, December 30, 2014
Translated from Russian by J. Hawk

The former President of Ukraine gave Poroshenko and his advisors a lecture on how to end the civil war and how to start a national dialogue.

The former President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko stated in an interview that more than half of Ukrainians would not support the country joining NATO or enshrining the Ukrainian language as the only official language.

“If you are in favor of a single official language in Ukraine, please keep in mind that more than half of the people would not support this idea.”

Yushchenko also believes that the Poroshenko regime’s desire to push the country into NATO is likewise a measure to which 60% of Ukrainians are opposed.

“If you want to transform Ukraine’s security policy toward membership in a European collective security structures, keep in mind that 60% of the country will not understand why.”

In addition, Viktor Yushchenko argued in favor of a general national dialogue:

“Whenever we talk of policies that may be given the label “Yanukovych policies”, one has to remember that, in addition to Yanukovych, these policies were backed by 12-14 million of Ukrainians. So if we want to reach a national consensus, a national rapprochement, we shouldn’t speak of Yanukovych but rather those 14 millions who think along the same lines as Yanukovych. We have to understand our strategic interests and our past, all the while preserving a national dialogue.”

The former president underscored the need for the national dialogue to compel Poroshenko and his supporters to take into consideration the interests of all citizens of Ukraine, so that Ukraine’s diversity would never again become the source of conflict:

“The diversity of our country cannot simply be a set of contradictions, but rather a distinguishing feature, and once we realize that these differences exist then the next step is to plan how to reconcile these differences.”

Translator’s Note:

Given the mounting pressure from the West to come to terms with Russia (as evidenced by newly announced IMF conditions for the next loan to Ukraine, which include Russia’s postponement of Ukraine’s repayment of its debt to Russia), it may be that Yushchenko, while an opponent of Yanukovych in the presidential elections, is nevertheless being seen both by Ukrainians and (especially) the West as someone more capable of effectively enforcing a more conciliatory Ukrainian policy toward Russia. This is something that Poroshenko (due to the absence of his own political team) is incapable of doing (which is reflected by the cold shoulder he has received from the EU) and the Yatsenyuk/Turchinov clique is unwilling to do, preferring instead to attempt extorting billions of euros by threatening Ukraine’s collapse—which would be very difficult to avoid in the absence of the resumption of favorable Russian economic policies toward Ukraine. Yushchenko represents a substantially pro-Western political tilt without the virulent anti-Russian rhetoric that the current Kiev government excels at, which arguably makes him the most qualified to move Ukraine out of its current crisis.